

Plato's waking state - hupar:

Interweaving the *Republic*, the *Statesman*, and the *Laws*

Brief summary

This dissertation examines the relationship between Plato's dialogues *Republic*, *Statesman*, and the *Laws* in terms of their political background. It presents an alternative perspective that focuses on two key factors: the role of the παράδειγμα (example or model) and the distinction between ὄναρ or ὀνειρώττειν “dreaming state” and ὕπαρ “waking state”. In the *Republic*, we observe the development of a παράδειγμα of a just city, which will gradually enable the short-sighted discussants of Socrates (368c9) to address the complex issue of justice in the human soul, i.e., to approach the Form of justice. The same is true in the *Statesman*, where the Eleatic visitor employs the παράδειγμα of weaving to explore another tangled topic, this of statesmanship. However, the παράδειγμα is not only an insightful example but is also linked to the Forms, such as the Form of the Good, which serves as a model (540a9) for the philosophers to set both themselves and the city of the Callipolis in order.

At this juncture, the distinction between ὄναρ “dreaming state” and ὕπαρ “waking state” becomes crucial to understanding the relationship of these dialogues from a novel perspective. In the *Statesman*, the Eleatic visitor suggests that by detecting the lynchpin between the παράδειγμα of the art of weaving and statesmanship, the discussants will be able to shift from a state of dreaming to a “waking state” ὕπαρ (278e10). This transition, in turn, enables them to attain knowledge γνωρίζειν (278e10) of city management. Similarly, when the philosophers, who, in contrast to the φιλοθεάμονες or the φιλήκοοι (476b4), can identify the connection between justice in the city and the soul, i.e., the οἰκιοπραγία (434c8), reenter the Cave and assume sovereignty, they will have attained the “waking state”. Such a mode of existence under philosophical governance would constitute an ὕπαρ for both the philosophers ὑμῖν and the interlocutors of Socrates ἡμῖν (520c6).

In the *Laws*, the city of Magnesia is constructed according to the plan of the first paradigmatic city (739e1–5), striving to resemble it as closely as possible. However, given the unbridgeable gap between the first model city and the two subsequent cities that depend on it, the goal is no longer the pure waking state, but rather the almost complete one ἔσται σχεδὸν ὕπαρ ἀποτετελεσμένον (959b5), as indicated by the Athenian's allusion to Penelope's dream of geese, recounted to Odysseus in his disguise as a beggar. Similarly, just as humans cannot achieve complete identity with God but can only strive to resemble Him as far as possible ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (*Theaetetus* 176b1–2), so Magnesia cannot be identical to the παράδειγμα of the first city, but can only approximate it as closely as feasible. Consequently, the lawmakers of Magnesia employ the model city as a guiding principle in the design of their city.

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